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Introduction
The study of political socialization and its use as a tool for state-building investigates
how state regimes pass on expected ideals and beliefs to the younger generation. Therein, many
scholars point out that the most effective way to implement a particular form of political
socialization is through educational policy administered in the school system. In fact, civic
education plays a key role in determining what ideals get passed on to students and whether
those students will become active or passive participants in the political system of their home
state. Building upon and extending earlier research on political socialization and state-building,
this thesis argues that greater emphasis on civic education and political participation by youth
will lead to a more democratic state regime.
Despite the abundance of research in the field, the role that political socialization through
education plays in newly created and democratizing states is a relatively overlooked topic that
calls for scholarly attention. To address this gap in the literature, the objective of this thesis is to
explore the level of attention newly created states place on their educational systems for the
purpose of political socialization (specifically, vis-à-vis civic education) when enacting statebuilding policies. I also examine whether the values and practices to which students are exposed
(such as civic versus ethnic nationalism) correlate with the type of regime a state seeks to
become, particularly in terms of democratization.
This thesis proceeds in the following order. First, I provide an overview of the literature
on political socialization theory, civic education theory, and prior studies on the countries that I
focus on, and I describe the historical context of each country. Then I state the importance of this
study in terms of its theoretical contributions. Next, I discuss the theoretical basis of the study
and my hypotheses. I then present the methodology of my study, reviewing the methods of
analysis I employ along with the basics of my model. In the section that follows, I present the
1

data I use. I then make observations within the data and present my findings. Last, I discuss the
implications of my findings, the limitations to the study, and my conclusions.
As I will show in the literature review, a number of studies have been conducted
regarding political socialization theory as well as the importance of civic education in terms of
fostering democracy. With that said, most such studies are dated and in need of updating. There
has been some recent interest in the subject, but such studies seem to go case by case, or at most
compare only two states. Numerous articles mention political socialization through education as
a tool for state building, but the topic itself has been only slightly researched since the end of the
Cold War. Much existing literature has to do with socializing students into communist or Marxist
ideology during the 1960s and 1970s. Regarding how communist political socialization played a
part in the states I examine, I also review the literature that discusses political socialization in
Communist Yugoslavia. When it comes to the subject of state building, there does not seem to be
much literature that examines new states using their education system as a basis for building up
the values they want their future citizens to believe and practice. Few studies have focused on
education (in particular, civic education) that a state provides in regard to how democratic or undemocratic a state has become within a certain period after independence. As a final note, the
vast majority of the studies on political socialization within newly created states have focused on
former European colonies in either Africa or Asia. My study attempts to fill these gaps.
My study applies the theory of political socialization to the experience of three newly
created states of the former Yugoslavia, namely Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina.
I briefly describe each state’s experience under Yugoslav communism, and compare each of the
cases with one another to analyze what impact, if any, political socialization through their
educational systems has made in terms of how civically engaged their youth are. As mentioned
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in the literature review, many studies argue that education leads to an increase in participation in
politics; but my study intends to explain what particular factors within education (particularly,
primary and secondary education) cause increased participation.

3

Literature Review
Political socialization as a topic has been around since the time of the ancient Greeks, but
the field came to the forefront of scholarly attention and research during the second quarter of the
twentieth century (e.g., Sigel 1970; Slomeczynski 1998). The focus of the early research was on
how Western nations were implementing civic norms through their educational systems to
promote democracy (e.g., Prewitt 1970; Slomeczynski 1998). Sears (1975) contends that the
modern study of political socialization began in the United States in the 1920s with American
studies in civic education. This is important, because from the beginning of American studies in
political socialization, the importance of civic education was at the forefront of the research. Of
greater interest, Danoff (2010) mentions that many politicians, such as President Lincoln and
President Wilson, had all suggested that leaders in America should make instilling democratic
attitudes one of their main priorities.
I will discuss Eastern and Central European countries under communist rule further on,
but it is important to note here that a substantial amount of literature on political socialization
during the Cold War years was about the way in which communist regimes socialized their
students into the Marxist-Leninist (and for a while, Stalinist) system (see, for example, Bertsch
and Ganschow 1976; Jambrek 1975; Volgyes 1975).
The remainder of those earlier studies throughout the Cold War era focused on other
aspects of political socialization. Although these other forms will not be the subject of this study,
it is essential to mention them briefly. For instance, Sears (1975) states that aside from political
participation, attachment to the political system and partisan attitudes are the other two main
areas into which political socialization could be subdivided. What makes these three areas
different is that attachment and partisanship involve attitudes, while participation involves overt
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behavioral acts (Sears 1975, 94). Since I am focusing my study on actual results, that is, the
behavior of people, my focus is on participation although this does not mean that other areas of
political socialization are less important. Similarly, Dennis (1968) approaches the concept of
political socialization by adopting a more nuanced perspective that includes cross-cultural
aspects of political socialization, sub-group, and sub-cultural variations, as well as the political
learning process. Also mentioned are the varieties of content of political socialization and its
agents and agencies (Dennis 1968, 88).
The content of political socialization along with its agents and agencies are important to
this thesis because I treat these two sub-fields as being attached to the political learning process.
This is because content can matter a great deal in the learning process, such as explaining to
students what ideals they should follow and practice. The agents and agencies are important
because this sub-field may set and facilitate the type of political socialization through education
that the state regime requires.
Political socialization can be defined as the process through which people learn to adopt
the norms, values, attitudes, and behaviors accepted and practiced by the ongoing system (Sigel
1970, xii). This process assumes that individuals will make these norms and behaviors their own
through passive or active behaviors. Throughout the literature, many scholars make a connection
between the learning process and actual participation: in other words, the learning outcome must
correspond to what citizens are being taught (see, for example, Dennis 1968; Hollygus 2005).
For instance, Peefley and Rohrschneider (2003) point to the connection between learning civic
norms as the process and political participation as the output. They find that citizens may easily
endorse democratic regime ideals, but putting such ideals into actual practice may require more
work. To exemplify, they refer to the cases in which seemingly tolerant states that espouse

5

democratic views may not actually practice ―tolerance‖ when it comes to accepting the views of
the minority (Peefley and Rohrschneider 2003). Other factors such as differences in generational
norms may influence political participation. Putnam (2001) notes that ―baby boomers and their
children are less likely to vote than their parents or grandparents‖ (p. 34). Related to this is the
generational hypothesis, which posits that a younger generation might reject or rebel against the
attitudes of the generation that preceded it (Westby and Braungart, in Sigel 1970). This might
show that even societal norms and values are subject to change over time.
A number of works written during the Cold War discuss political socialization in
communist states. Volgyes (1975) mentions that politics and values are brought into nearly every
subject, from mathematics to languages, and this was certainly true of most Eastern European
states under communism, including Yugoslavia. Volgyes’ (1975) study on Eastern Europe
demonstrated that formal structures of political socialization are more important in communist
countries than in non-communist countries. The most important of these structures, which
oversees all agencies of formal political socialization, is the Communist Party, which
―determines the norms and values which will be stressed in schools to students‖ (Volgyes 1975,
14). Youth leagues were considered as other important tools in an effort to instill desired
behavior in youth, but the author finds that the effectiveness of such leagues was usually low in
most countries (Volgyes 1975, 15).
When looking at works specifically related to Yugoslavia, one observes that Volgyes’
general argument fits into the Yugoslavian context. In a study done by Denitch, the author maps
out five characteristics of Yugoslav socialism (Denitch in Bertsch and Ganschow 1976, 269). Of
those, the political, historical, and sociological characteristics are most important when one is
talking about political socialization. The author mentions that politically, Yugoslavia was a
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multi-national state with no dominant nationality and was therefore marked by political
decentralization, with different ethnic majorities holding political power (Denitch in Bertsch and
Ganschow 1976, 269). This point became influential when the member states of Yugoslavia
began declaring independence. The historical aspect is important, because nationalism does not
play a role until Yugoslavia breaks apart. Instead, cohesion was based on history, specifically the
successful war for national liberation against the Nazis. The sociological aspect simply refers to
Yugoslavia’s political culture, which focuses on self-managing bodies in institutions and in the
communes. This latter part is especially important when one discusses how students were
expected to practice the ideals they were taught. In Yugoslav socialism, students are like workers
in a factory, responsible as a unit for work performance. This means that students were to micromanage themselves, be responsible for one another, and were taught that if one of them failed,
then the class as a whole failed. Therefore, they were putting into practice the communal way of
succeeding by working together as a group.
Perhaps the most relevant findings to my work in Woodward’s study are what resulted
when these communist ideals were put into practice. Students in Yugoslavia would also send
representatives to authoritative decision-making bodies, such as the school council, to put into
practice participation at the decision-making level (Woodward in Bertsch and Ganschow 1976).
The author finds mixed results within secondary school students in Yugoslavia, because students
were instead learning to support an oligarchic, personal pattern of participation (Woodward in
Bertsch and Ganschow 1976, 310). Finally, Woodward (1976) says that teachers are the ones
upholding this type of view by maintaining that students are not sufficiently mature or
knowledgeable to take part in self-management. This type of system remained in place until the
late 1980s, which Yugoslavia began to break apart. This is important because the results of this
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study may be similar to what I might find in my own research—that there may be an illusion of
participation without any real increase in democracy.
As a result of the regime changes that occurred in Europe at the end of the Cold War,
research in the field of political socialization changed from focusing on different political
ideologies to focusing on democratic values and norms (see, for example, Prewitt 1970; TorneyPurta et al. 1999). Many works focus on political socialization through education and the
implications for democracies. In an earlier study, Lipset (1959) states that the philosophy of
democratic government sees increased education as a basic requirement of democracy. The
author also mentions that the higher one's education, the more likely one is to believe in
democratic values and to support democratic practices (Lipset 1959). Woodward draws a similar
conclusion (1976), stating that the more educated a person is, the more he or she is capable of
self-management, referring to Yugoslav socialism.
In a more recent study, Westheimer and Kahne (2004) point out that democracy is
strengthened through civic education, a topic that I will address fully further on. A correlation is
therefore drawn between education and democracy. The authors define a ―good citizen‖ as an
individual who would be personally responsible, participatory, and justice-oriented‖
(Westheimer and Kahne 2004). Miller (2002) says that voting is an expression of an informed
citizen. An additional correlation attributed to works by Lipset and Coleman is that of
modernization and democratization (Almond and Verba 1989). On the origins of a citizen’s
political interests, Shani (2009) finds that if one understands the current political system, one will
likely take an active part in that system. However, Shani (2009) contradicts Lipset and
Woodward by finding that the effects of educational attainment correlate minimally to political
engagement. Kenworthy and Malami (1999) in their study about gender equality came to a
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similar conclusion in terms of education and participation by women. In their analysis, the
authors found that there is little confirmation within the data to suggest that higher education
among women will lead to the election of more women into national legislatures (Kenworthy and
Malami 1999). Their study also finds that prior studies on the topic have not found any evidence
supporting that same relationship. Almond and Verba (1989) allude to a possibility of a spurious
relationship between economic development and democratization, since a number of significant
cases exist that cannot be explained by Lipset and Coleman’s methods. Therefore, while early
works made a correlation between education and political participation, more recent studies seem
to suggest that some other factors should be included in such a connection.
With further research into what specifically in education impacts levels of political
participation, the term ―civic education‖ emerged. Defined broadly, civic education means
educating a nation’s youth about the civic ideals and standards expected of them by society.
Macedo (2005) states that civic education takes place in schools, unions, voluntary associations,
and places of worship. Citizens acquire knowledge about political affairs by reading the
newspaper, watching the news, listening to the radio, and talking with friends (Macedo 2005, 8).
Therefore, civic education is not only received at school, but also can be viewed as a continuing
process of collecting political information. However, for the purposes of this study, emphasis
will be on civic learning through schools.
Hollygus (2005) tests the link between higher education and political behavior.
Specifically, the author mentions that there is a lack of empirical evidence as to why education
increases political participation (Hollygus 2005, 25). Hollygus’ contribution is the civic
education hypothesis, stating that education provides the skills necessary to become politically
involved and the knowledge to understand and accept democratic principles (Hollygus 2005, 27).
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The condition she introduces, then, is that formal education must include civic education or a
social science curriculum for students to learn those values. Hollygus (2005) also finds that
higher education might help citizens understand the relationship between political action and
preservation of a democratic system. Furthermore, the author finds that a social science
curriculum does affect voter turnout and political participation positively. She shows that higher
educational attainment without the civic component does not result in higher political
participation, an example being that the relationship between SAT math scores and political
engagement is negative (Hollygus 2005, 40). Hollygus’ study is therefore important to mine
because she introduces and tests a civic education hypotheses, which is part of what I intend to
do in my study.
As already mentioned, the current political regime in some states might not be completely
―democratic‖ as it is understood in its western form. Nikolayenko (2007), for example, mentions
that several regimes are in transition between a prior political order and a more democratic
system. In such cases, a civic education curriculum could have an effect on such a transition.
First, it is important to define what constitutes a democracy. For the purposes of my study, I find
adequate the definition that Freedom House espouses: ―concept of democracy is the idea that
government exists to secure the rights of the people and must be based on the consent of the
governed.‖ Nikolayenko's (2007) study notes a hole in prior works in that there has been slight
research concentrated on the political attitudes of adolescents in Europe, which would be
important to the future of regimes in transition. In relationship to civic education, Nikolayenko
(2007) finds that an open classroom climate may foster the actual practice of democratic values,
but it weakens national pride. Thus, it may seem that in some regimes in transition, a heightened
sense of nationalism among students decreases upon their exposure to and actual practice of
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democratic norms and ideals. Perhaps the factors involved that mark this transition to democracy
in countries are ethnic and civic nationalism.
Nationalism is made up of two components: emotion or sentiment and political doctrine
(Taras and Ganguly 2008). Kunovich and Deitelbaum (2004) refer to two different forms of
nationalism—ethnic and civic nationalism—when it comes to political policies within a country.
The authors describe how such national policies make their way into the public school systems to
pass on such values to the next generation of citizens. This is relevant to civic education and
participation because it indicates to what degree membership in a nation is open or closed
(Kunovich and Deitelbaum 2004). Civic nationalism is best defined as the ―nation-state and
one’s membership in and loyalty to it in terms of citizenship, common laws, and political
participation regardless of ethnicity and lineage‖ (Taras and Ganguly 2008, 3). Ethnic
nationalism is defined as ―an individual’s membership and loyalty to the nation-state in terms of
lineage and vernacular culture‖ (Taras and Ganguly 2008, 3). We can see that in terms of
political participation, civic nationalism is more inclusive than is ethnic nationalism. These two
terms are integral to this thesis because nationalism was integral in the dissolution of Yugoslavia,
and I intend to show to what extent each type influenced the type of participation observed in
each country.
There remains a noticeable gap in the literature. There have been a few studies about
state-building in this region, and among these few studies, most concentrate on state-building in
post-war Bosnia and Herzegovina (see, for example, Burg and Shoup 2000; Cousins and Cater
2001). Specifically regarding the themes of education as a tool for state-building, Fischer (2005)
looks into the role that civic education plays in building up a post-war society in Bosnia. The
author notes that ideals of multi-ethnicity and interethnic tolerance are important to the
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government of Bosnia to socialize students of all backgrounds to be able to work well with one
another (Fischer 2005). However, curriculum reform is an ongoing issue because certain
subjects, notably history and the humanities, remain highly stereotypical between the three
constituent peoples of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Fischer 2005). Especially present in middle
school curriculums as of 2000 are subjects of ―introduction to democracy‖ and ―civic education‖
(Fischer 2005). Peefley and Rohrschneider (2003) apply a multi-level model of democratic
learning that focuses on exposure to democratic practices as a way of increasing political
engagement. What makes this study stand out is that the authors see ―engagement as not simply
as voting, but actually using one's own civil liberties‖ (Peefley and Rohrschneider 2003, 246).
This study included Croatia and Bosnia, and finds that among people surveyed, 2 percent of
Croatians and 1.4 percent of Bosnians would allow minorities to hold office (Peefley and
Rohrschneider 2003). Additionally, they found that 8.5 percent of Croatians and 4 percent of
Bosnians would allow minorities to have demonstrations (Peefley and Rohrschneider 2003).
These numbers are surprising, but reflect the author’s conclusion that there remains a disconnect
between wanting a democratic system and actually practicing democratic ideals, something that
can be aided by a stronger presence of civic nationalism instead of what appears to be ethnic
nationalism. In Ramet and Matic (2007), the presence of nationalism is further apparent in
Croatia, where the authors note that ―nationalism of the 1990s had a major impact on the
interpretation of (Croatian) history‖ under the rule of President Tudjman (Ramet and Matic 2007,
366). A different scenario emerged in the development of Slovenia, according to Strajns' (1999)
study of citizenship there. Upon examining national political discourse, the author finds a
strengthened sense of national or Slovenian ethnic identity among the right-wing parties (Strajn,
in Torney-Porta et al. 1999). Since the middle class dominates Slovenian society, its views of
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pluralism and democracy have come to dominate the Slovenian educational system. It is
interesting that in Strajn's study, Slovenia's transition from a communist regime to a democratic
one was facilitated by its better economic situation and because its populace had experienced a
relatively free flow of information from abroad (Strajn, in Torney-Porta et al. 1999).
Additionally in regards to Croatia, Kunovich and Deitelbaum (2004) point to another factor
playing an important role to state-building, which is the Catholic church. As in other countries in
the region, the church managed to gain a great deal of influence upon the collapse of
communism, and succeeded in influencing the shape of the new Croatian society. Most
importantly, the authors note that ethnic nationalism was present in Croatia during and following
its war of independence (Kunovich and Deitelbaum 2004). From these prior studies on the
countries that are the focus of my thesis, some common themes can be found, such as the
importance of social studies curriculum and ethnic nationalism. There are gaps in these studies,
and since most were done during the first decade of independence, I expect my thesis to shed
new light on the current impact of education on democracy in these countries.
Briefly, some studies provide arguments against the value of political socialization's
impact on the activities of younger generations. Prewitt (1970), for example, says that new states
are increasing their attention to their own educational systems for the purpose of political
socialization. However, Prewitt's (1970) case study on Uganda found no evidence that the school
system can be used effectively for programmed political education (Prewitt in Sigel 1970).
Although the background and experience of a former colony in Africa might hold little in
common with a country in Europe, the case study does present empirical results of political
socialization through education in a newly created state. Other studies have also mentioned that
pure political indoctrination in schools tends to bore students and lessens their interest in actively
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participating in the current system. We saw this when discussing the impact of political
socialization through education in communist states (see, for example, Volgyes 1975). In Ulc
(1975), this type of political indoctrination in Czechoslovakia led to boredom and fatigue among
students. In Woodward (1976), students also responded passively or negatively to how the
education system was socializing them politically. The author finds that students learn early to
obey their ―superiors,‖ which led to a culture of passive participation in the Yugoslav communist
system. Since the evidence is mixed, further studies in this area are clearly needed, specifically to
test the impact of civic education on political socialization.
Tourney-Purta et al. (1999) point to the lack of research in the field of civic education. In
an effort to address this issue, they conduct a comprehensive study on civic education, posing the
following question: ―Should civic education be oriented towards enduring social or political
values, towards rights and principles for current institutions and a stable political order?‖
(Torney-Purta et al. 1999, 13). The premise of this question, which closely relates to the purpose
of this thesis, is that civic education is not universally viewed as teaching a uniform set of
democratic values. Even though instruments measuring the impact of civic education on
democracy exist, they are not being weighed to produce new data.
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Historical and Political Background
I would like to now turn to discussing the historical period of each country from
independence up to the period where my study begins to give some historical context. After the
death of Marshal Tito in 1980, who as President of Yugoslavia managed to keep the multiethnic
country together, ethnic tensions began to rise as Serbian leaders tried increase their relative
power within Yugoslavia. This resulted in the Slovene and Croat delegations to the League of
Communists of Yugoslavia, out of their disagreements with the Serbian faction, leaving that
institution. On June 25, 1991. both Slovenia and Croatia declared independence. Fighting was
brief in Slovenia, and after some international pressure, Yugoslavia recognized the independence
of Slovenia. In Croatia, ethnic Serbs in the Krajina province broke away from the rest of Croatia
in anticipation of Croat independence and formed the Republic of Serb Krajina in April 1991.
Yugoslavia also began to support the ethnic Serbs within Croatia, which would begin the
Croatian Independence War that lasted until a formal agreement was signed in November 1995.
In this context, in April 1992, the Bosniaks and ethnic Croats within Bosnia and Herzegovina
declared their independence, which was soon recognized by most of the international
community. Almost immediately, Yugoslavia took issue with the Bosnians 1 declaring their
independence, which did not have the support of ethnic Serbs within that newly created country.
This early alliance between the Croats and Bosniaks dissolved, as immediately several
disagreements arose between the two groups and a three-way civil war erupted, with the Bosnian
Serbs on one side, the Bosnian Croats on another, and the Bosniaks on a third. Each group
dominated a specific region, and the Croats and Serbs benefited from support by Croatia and

1

In this thesis, the term Bosnian refers to a citizen of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The term Bosniak refers to the
ethnic group within Bosnia which is almost entirely made up of adherents to Islam. The other ethnic groups that
make up Bosnia and Herzegovina are the Croats which are predominantly Roman Catholic and the Serbs which are
predominantly Eastern Orthodox.
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Yugoslavia, respectively (Coppieters et al. 2008). In several ways, clashes in the Bosnian war
could be considered part of the Croatian Independence war.
From the start of the Bosnian War, three attempts were made by European mediators to
end it. Each, however, failed to produce a real breakthrough from the peace talks (Paczulla
2004). Both the Croatian war and the Bosnian war proceeded, with intermittent fighting, for the
next three years. At the beginning of the Clinton administration, the United States began to turn
more attention what was occurring in the Balkans. The Clinton administration realized that both
the Croatians and Bosniaks would be in a better position if they would end the war and focus on
fighting the Serbians in Bosnia (Shrader 2003). With the help of Croatia, the Croats and
Bosniaks in Bosnia and Herzegovina signed a formal agreement ending their conflict on
February 25, 1995. With that, the war turned into one of Croatia and the Federation of Bosnia
and Herzegovina against the Serbs within their own respective territories (Shrader 2003). By
1994, NATO also began to increase its involvement in the war by enforcing UN mandates.
However, the war escalated in the summer of 1995 when the Croatians launched a military
offensive, re-taking Krajina from the Serbs (Paczulla 2004, 261). A joint offensive with the
Bosnians led to several military defeats for the Bosnian Serbs, which together with NATO's
Operation Deliberate Force compelled the Bosnian Serbs to enter into peace talks (Coppieters et
al. 2008). The agreement that ended hostilities in Bosnia and Herzegovina was the Dayton
Agreement, which created a power-sharing structure between the three main ethnic groups.
There still remained, as I show in my observations, great distrust between all three ethnic groups
due to the number of atrocities committed by all sides during the conflict. I will discuss in greater
detail the political structure of Bosnia and Herzegovina in a later section.
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It is also important to discuss the leaders who were key actors in establishing
independence in each country. Each also played an important role in the formulation of a state
regime that would significantly influence the development of each state. Milan Kucan, President
of Slovenia, was initially known as a leader of the faction that wanted to gradually federalize and
democratize Yugoslavia, as opposed to the goals of the Serb faction of Slobodan Milosevic.
After declaring independence, he made sure that Slovenia quickly transitioned toward a
European style democracy. He was formally elected president of Slovenia in 1992, and was reelected to a second term in 1997. In contrast to the leaders of Croatia and Bosnia and
Herzegovina, Kucan could be classified as a civic, not ethnic, nationalist leader. Croatia, since
independence, was led by President Franjo Tudman, and Bosnia and Herzegovina was led by
Alija Izetbegovic. These leaders were nationalists, and much of their actions can be viewed
through that context. More specifically, Tudman was an ethnic nationalist (Bass 1998, 96) who
wanted to create a larger Croatia that would incorporate ethnic Croat areas of Bosnia and
Herzegovina, territories that he believed had historic ties to Croatia. He founded one of Croatia's
major political parties, the Croatian Democratic Union (Hrvatska demokratska zajednica, or
HDZ, in Croatian), which was to dominate Croatian politics until 2000. President Tudman's
presidency had authoritarian characteristics, in part due to the strong control his political party
exerted, and he remained in office until his death in November 1999. President Izetbegovic of
Bosnia and Herzegovina was a Bosniak, and his goal was to create an independent state in which
Bosniaks would not be subordinate to Serbs or Croats. After the Dayton Agreement, Izetbegovic
was the Bosniak member of the presidency. He retired from politics in 2000.
I find it important to briefly mention the type of political system in each country, and
how they relate to my study. At the time of its independence, Croatia’s political system was
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structured as a semi-presidential system, with the president and parliament roughly holding
similar authority within the government. The semi-presidential form of government was changed
to a parliamentary system by an amendment to the constitution in November 2000 (Burglund et
al. 2004, 485). The first three parliamentary elections were organized under different electoral
systems, first as a majority system, then as a segmented system, and finally as a proportional
system (Burglund et al. 2004, 483), which is the current system in Croatia. Under the current
system, the president is elected for a five year term, and can serve a maximum of two terms. The
prime minister is the head of the government and holds executive power. Parliament is elected
every four years. Its members are elected from twelve electoral districts within Croatia, with the
eleventh district representing the Croatian Diaspora and the twelfth representing ethnic
minorities within Croatia. To be eligible to vote, Croatians living abroad must have Croatian
citizenship, or be a child of at least one Croatian parent (Siaroff 2000, 204). Most of the
Croatians living abroad are in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and are considered strong supporters of
the Croatian Democratic Union party (Burglund et al. 2004, 484; and National Endowment for
Democracy). There have been noted discrepancies in regards to the number of voters for each
electoral district. As it is noted that some voters are registered in two electoral districts, while
those living in Bosnia and Herzegovina can easily vote in the district for the Diaspora and then
vote within Croatia (National Endowment for Democracy). A further point in regards to Croatia
is that it reserves eight seats in parliament for ethnic minorities, three for ethnic Serbs and five
for other ethnic minorities (Burglund et al. 2004, 483). Slovenia is also a parliamentary
democracy in which the prime minister holds executive power. The president is elected by
popular vote every five years, serving a maximum of two terms. Parliament has eighty-eight
members elected by proportional representation, plus one more member each for the Hungarian
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and Italian minorities (European Election Database). As in Croatia, Slovenians living abroad
may vote in elections (Siaroff 2000).
Bosnia and Herzegovina is a parliamentary republic, operating under a political structure
first established under the Dayton Agreement. There, it established the office of the High
Representative, who oversees the implementation of the Dayton Agreement and has the power to
remove members of the government or veto laws the high representative sees as favoring one
group over the others. Two entities form the country, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina
and the Republika Srpska. The council of ministers is the executive branch of the government,
and the presidency is made up of three members, each representing the three main ethnic groups
and serving a four-year term. The presidency rotates every eight months between the three
presidents. Parliament itself is made up of two chambers: the House of Peoples has fifteen
members in total, five members for each ethnic group, and the House of Representatives has
fourteen members for each ethnic group. The former group is appointed, while the latter is
elected through open party lists to four-year terms (Belloni 2007).
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Theoretical and Methodological Framework
As to the theoretical framework of this study, I merge basic political socialization theory
with more recent civic education theory. Political socialization theory posits that through
socializing actors (such as schools or the media), people will acquire political attitudes and
values and make them their own. This theory is general enough that it is not limited to
democracies, but can be applied to almost any regime type, since the theory assumes that all
regimes seek continuity by politically socializing its citizens. Civic education theory narrows the
topic of political socialization in that it focuses on how democratic regimes socialize their
nations’ youth. Specifically, civic education theory proposes that education provides the skills
for understanding and accepting democratic principles so citizens can meaningfully participate in
the political process, therefore creating a more democratic state. This theory is important to the
field of political socialization because it states that formal education must include civic education
or a social science curriculum for democratic ideals to be properly learned. It is therefore
significant in using both theories together, since the nations considered in the study did not start
out as full-fledged democracies, but are regimes in transition, and the result of such transition
may not necessarily be to a full ―western‖ type democracy.
Accordingly, this thesis will utilize data to make observations in two hypotheses about
the impact of political socialization through education on participation and democracy in newly
created countries. I expect that a greater emphasis on civic education (via promotion of civic
nationalism and political participation of youth) will lead toward a more democratic state regime.
In other words, I anticipate that civic education is likely to promote civic nationalism and
political participation (rather than ethnic nationalism and passive obedience to political
authority) among a state’s youth within a recently created state, leading to a more democratic
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citizenry (Hypothesis 1). I also argue that higher levels of education do not necessarily lead to a
more democratic state if ethnic nationalism is present in the national discourse embedded in
education (Hypothesis 2).
In this model, I do not expect to find that participation will be greatly affected by an
increased presence of ethnic nationalism. However, I do recognize that it has some impact, since
active participation by all ethnic groups within a country, and not just of the majority, is also a
factor in determining how democratic a state may or may not be. Here, my major independent
variable is the form of political socialization through education policy conditioned by (1) the
type of nationalism (ethnic versus civic) and (2) the level of political participation promoted in
the education system. My dependent variable is the level of democracy within a state.
To make observations regarding my hypotheses, I elected to comparatively analyze the
Republic of Slovenia, the Republic of Croatia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina, based on a certain
criteria. First, the states had to have been recently created. By ―recently,‖ I mean the state had to
have come into existence as an independent nation in the 1990s. Second, the state had to have
emerged from a communist regime. Third, the states being analyzed had to have started a
transition toward democracy. At least some semblance of establishment has had to have
occurred, as opposed to having attained its independence or its government facing continued
instability. This latter point is especially important, because it facilitates access to previously
collected data from the state since its independence. Additionally, what helped me choose these
three states is the fact that they all shared a common history and that they emerged out of the
same political entity, Communist Yugoslavia. Of the successor states of Yugoslavia, I choose
these three because each state’s particular ethnic make-up lent it well to this comparative study.
My aim, in part, is to account for the impact of civic and ethnic nationalism, so obviously the
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ethnic make-up of a nation is a major factor. Slovenia is largely homogenous in ethnic
composition; Croatia has a large majority of ethnic Croats, but also a significant minority of
Serbs; and Bosnia and Herzegovina is very diverse ethnically and culturally. The Republic of
Macedonia, as the other successor state of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro formed the basis
of Yugoslavia, and therefore cannot be considered recently created states), would have also
qualified for this study, but available data for this country were lacking.
My research employs a comparative case study analysis of Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia
and Herzegovina. In addition to my qualitative analysis, I also descriptively analyze quantitative
data on these three states. Specifically, I gather the data on the (a) type of education (civic versus
ethnic, as well as active participation versus passive obedience), (b) levels of education, (c)
amount of funding for education, and (d) levels of literacy for each state. I also gather data on the
level of democracy for each state. Regarding the type of quantitative analysis, I had intended to
run a time series analysis regarding levels of education, political participation, and levels of
democracy over the period that is being studied. However, data from the mid-1990s are not
available in their entirety for all three states, so I have limited my analysis to a period of ten
years, from 1998 to 2008. The start date for such analysis is also significant, because it was the
first year after the Dayton Accords (which ended the Bosnian War) were put into practice, so
armed conflict would not be a factor in this study. Another reason for not doing a time series
analysis was the lack of data on a month-by-month level. With only a ten-year period to analyze,
this would have not been sufficient for an in-depth analysis, and thus is functional only for
descriptive purposes. To find any correlation of the above factors, as well as include additional
factors, I utilize cross-tabulations and comparison tables. Specifically, I break down the level of
democracy in each state over the time period of this study. I then look at the polity score of each
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country during the time period. This is followed by observing different factors that influence
how democratic or autocratic a state may be, which encompasses political competitiveness,
regulation of participation, and competitiveness of political participation.
To increase confidence in my inferences, I consider a number of additional factors.
Specifically, I consider the impact of fragmentation on level of democracy. Fragmentation
concerns how divided a country is in terms of the political control the central government has on
the entirety of the country. As I mentioned earlier, I specifically chose these three countries
because their independence has been fully established, and this will allow me to observe whether
this is really so. Additional variables can best be separated into two categories. I use indicators
for income inequality and GDP to identify any relationship between the relative wealth of a
nation and its level of democracy. To further observe any correlation, I use expenditure on
education as a percentage of GDP. I also take into consideration demographics (ethnic and
religious) of each state to check how these variables might affect, if at all, the presence of ethnic
or civic nationalism and subsequently the level of political participation. Finally, I consider the
levels adult and youth literacy along with average years of education for adults of each country
to observe basic education’s impact on political participation.
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Data
The data I use for this study come mainly from the following sources. The first is
UNESCO’s Institute for Statistics in Education. The data the institute provides goes by year, and
it should be noted that the data collected from Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Slovenia all
begin in 1999. Furthermore, the information gathered from UNESCO along with the United
Nations Development Program (UNDP) is primarily used for the additional factors I consider
apart from the ones included in my hypotheses. The figures that this study uses include the
starting and ending age of compulsory education; school life expectancy (primary and
secondary); and public expenditure on education as a percentage of GDP and as a percentage of
government expenditure. Furthermore, adult literacy rates, youth literacy rates, and GDP per
capita for each year and average years of education for adults were also collected from these
sources.
The second data source is the Civics Education Study (CIVED), which was conducted by
the International Association for the Evaluation of Educational Achievement (IEA). The Civics
Education Study measures global understanding of civic concepts, including but not limited to
civic knowledge and skills. Civic attitudes of students, which are related to political
participation, are also an important part of CIVED.
The last three sources of data are especially important for making observations regarding
participation and level of democracy. The third source is from the International Institute for
Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA), which provides a voter turnout database, broken
down by presidential and parliamentary elections. It also provides statistics on the percentage of
voter turnout, the number of registered voters, the voting age population, the percentage of the
voting age population that actually voted, and the percentage of voters who voted for the first
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time. Additional information in this dataset came from a related site, Democracy Web, which
offers comparative studies in freedom. Data from Democracy Web that is incorporated into this
dataset include the type of government, the political rights score (from one to seven, in which
one is the highest score in terms of political rights), and the civil liberties score (also from one to
seven, with one being the highest for civil liberties) of each country. Further data provided by
Democracy Web are mostly descriptive, in which certain laws or circumstances within the
country are listed to explain why a change in political rights or civil liberties scores occurs from
one year to the next. This represents a more complete dataset than that provided by UNESCO,
which means the data begin from when all three countries became independent. The data from
IDEA are supplemented by the European Election Database (EED) to further ensure the accuracy
of election data. These data are significant to this study because it allows me fully observe the
correlation between voting participation and level of democracy, and cites specific reasons as to
why these levels might change from year to year.
The Polity IV dataset is the most significant source of information that allows me to
make further observations about political participation and levels of democracy quantitatively.
This dataset was also one of the most complete used in this thesis, though each country is
missing some data. Significantly, the Polity IV dataset provides indicators of democracy,
including competitiveness of political participation and regulation of participation. Each of these
indicators is based on an eleven-point scale (from zero to ten). Significant to this study is the
polity indicator, which measures how authoritarian or democratic a state is. The scale ranges
from ten, which signifies a state being strongly democratic, to negative ten, which signifies a
state being strongly autocratic. Polity itself is a general scale, and specifically I utilize the
individual indicators that measure democracy and autocracy separately. Another important
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indicator that I use as a sort of control factor is that of fragmentation of a state. This ranges from
zero, which indicates no overt fragmentation, to three, which indicates serious fragmentation. It
is noted, however, that information for this variable starts in 2000. Additional data that I use for
this study come from the World Bank and the World Development Indicators (WDI), from
which I got additional figures for income inequality, GDP, and demographics.
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Analysis
Before going through the data with regards to my hypotheses, I first look for the presence
of a civic education curriculum within the primary and secondary schools in Slovenia, Croatia,
and Bosnia and Herzegovina. This data came from the All-European Study on Education for
Democratic Citizenship Policies, which documents all forms of political education in each of the
states in this study. Here, I found that civic education in various forms is present throughout
primary and secondary education in all three countries. The type of civic education largely
focuses on civil rights and entitlements. Further descriptive analysis in regard to the presence of
a civics education curriculum is performed by examining the data provided by CIVED.
I then proceed to observe data which relates to the first correlation I propose, that an
increase in civic education leads to increased voter participation. Thus, I combine the data from
CIVED, and look at the voter participation percentages gathered from the IDEA dataset. Since
IDEA provides different numbers than actual voter participation, I will focus on three numbers:
the number of voting age population, the number of registered voters, and the percentage of
registered voters who actually voted. I will use the latter two numbers to observe the proposed
correlation between education and participation. Because this is a time series analysis by year
from 1998 to 2008, I note any differences in participation as new laws or curriculums are put into
place. I will also track any differences in participation in presidential and parliamentary
elections, because I want to avoid a spurious relationship if any pattern does exist in those
figures.
I then seek to observe the second correlation that I propose in my hypothesis—that
increased political participation among the populace has a positive effect on the level of
democracy. To make the observation, I use both the IDEA dataset and the Polity IV dataset,
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thereby increasing the reliability and robustness of my results. In the IDEA dataset, I draw a
correlation between the number of registered voters and the number who actually voted with the
Freedom House political rights and civil liberties scores. Because the data provided are separated
between presidential and parliamentary elections, this provides me further data points to
consider. I then follow up by addressing issues that may indicate a possible disconnect between
voter participation in the presidential and parliamentary elections. Here, I expect to answer any
issues relating to the change of political rights or civil liberties scores through the information
provided by Democracy Web, which lends insight into why the score may have changed from
one year to the next. It should be noted that Democracy Web lists a country’s political rights and
civil liberties scores for every year, not only during elections. Since the data I analyze from
IDEA only have scores for election years, it is necessary to further examine whether changes
occurred in the level of democracy for the years between each election. Moving from a
qualitative approach to a more quantitative approach, I run a number of cross-comparative
analyses through STATA on Polity IV to see the levels of democracy in each country. Because
my time series analysis runs only for eleven years, from 1998 to 2008, without any data available
by month, I resort to analyzing the results in a descriptive manner. Furthermore, I start my time
series analysis when each country became independent in 1992. (Slovenia gained independence
in 1991, but I chose 1992 as the starting point to have data simultaneously for each country.)
This enables me to note possible trends, or lack thereof, in the level of democracy prior to when
my actual analysis begins. These figures, however, will not be included for reasons that I will
explain in the results section. Because Polity IV allows me to account for democracy and
autocracy separately, I will run correlations for both variables to ensure the validity of the
individual polity score. I then consider the indicators of democracy to increase the robustness of
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my results. Thus, I run cross-tabulations for each state, by year, to determine the level each
indicator presents for each country. The results of the analyses from the IDEA dataset and the
cross-tabulations from the Polity IV dataset will then be compared side-by-side, to check
whether the results are the same or if they differ.
To make observations in my second hypothesis, which proposes that the presence of
ethnic nationalism within the educational system (holding the level of participation at a constant)
will not lead to an increase in the relative level of democracy, I first check through CIVED and
Democracy Web to find mentions of curriculum that may emphasize or re-enforce ethnic
divisions and/or ethnic nationalism. Accordingly, I will again look to see how these data, if
present, correlate with voter registration and actual voting through data from IDEA. I then
compare the respective polity scores and relative levels of democracy and autocracy.
I will then look at data from additional factors. First, I will seek to show that general
levels of education do not cause increases or decreases of voter participation and levels of
democracy. This will be done by gathering the literacy rates for youth and adults, along with the
rates for secondary school completion. These data will then be compared with the results of
earlier correlations for each state, specifically looking at the number of people registered to vote
and how many actually do vote. I then look at data relating to levels of national wealth. I will do
this by gathering data describing each country's GDP for each year in the time series, along with
expenditures on education as percentages of GDP. I will then compare this information to each
state's level of democracy without looking at levels of participation. Finally, I will take into
account political fragmentation within each country to ensure there is no major political division
that would affect the level of democracy.
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Findings
As I mentioned, the first step I take to analyze my first hypothesis is to determine
whether the social studies curriculum in each state promotes civic or ethnic nationalism. At this
point, I take a look at data collected from the ―All-European Study on Education for Democratic
Citizenship Policies.‖ Here, I find that in all three countries, especially after 2000, numerous
educational policy changes focused the social studies curricula toward education about
democratic principles. For example, in Croatia, there is a focus on human rights and democratic
citizenship. Such curricula exist at both the primary and secondary level of education, and are
considered cross-curricular, meaning such content is not limited to civics courses. In Slovenia,
the civic education curriculum is divided between a focus on civics and one on social studies.
Civic education, ethics, and civic culture are mandatory at the primary level (grades seven and
eight) and at the secondary level (grade nine). While social sciences are taught throughout the
secondary level (grades nine to eleven), no particular emphasis on civic education can be noticed
aside from that one mandatory course. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, major reform to include civic
education did not occur until the 2000-2001 academic school year. This is when ―introduction to
democracy‖ and ―civic education‖ were introduced as separate subjects into the curriculum at the
middle-school level. It appears that within the education system of Bosnia and Herzegovina,
there is an effort of continuous curriculum reform to break down ethnic stereotypes and
segregation within the school system. In the 2003-2004 academic school year, the subject of
―human rights and democracy‖ was introduced to the curriculum for seventh and eighth grade
students. Clearly, civic education is present at both the primary and secondary level in each state.
This does lead to the conclusion that, especially after 2000, teaching skills for democratic
behavior, which moves youth toward civic nationalism, is present within each state.

30

Some information on the curriculum of each country also shows that ethnic nationalism
was the dominant factor, specifically in the 1990s. This is not as overtly evident in Slovenia, at
least in terms of the educational system, although because it is a state with an ethnic
supermajority, there have been some noted problems regarding ethnic minorities from other
areas in the former Yugoslavia. These will be discussed further in the section that presents the
findings on the strength of democracy in Slovenia.
In Croatia, a more ethnically diverse state, nationalism and ethnic (Croat) nationalism
were present since its founding in 1992. The subject of history was especially the focus of such
nationalist rhetoric, largely being considered the result of the strong influence of President Franjo
Tudjman and his political party, the Croatian Democratic Union, which continued to be of major
importance after Tudjman’s death. The party is considered a center-right party, but its primary
ideology is the promotion of Croatian nationalism, although such rhetoric is thought to have
declined since 2002. Since that year, nationalism in the curriculum has gradually been replaced
with a genuine focus on democratic principles. These findings are relevant because they not only
provide background to the findings within the time series, but also because for the years 1998
and 1999, ethnic, and not civic, nationalism is considered the dominant factor in the Croatian
education system.
Perhaps the most persistent presence of ethnic nationalism appears in Bosnia and
Herzegovina. Although still considered a culturally divided state, in the 1990s, which would
include the first two years of the time series used in this thesis, it was very much ethnically
divided. The three dominant cultures are Bosniak, Croat, and Serb, each of which dominates a
certain region within the country, and which is consequently noticeable in the local school
system. In some of these regions, especially in Herzegovina, students are segregated by different
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ethnicities and faiths into separate schools. The entire social studies curriculum is most resistant
to reform, because such studies are taught differently depending on the school, which further
reinforces cultural distinctions within the country. Despite this, because of mandates placed upon
it by the European Union (EU) and a significant presence of NGOs, Bosnia and Herzegovina has
made the most strides in integrating its fractured educational system into a more unified model.
To see if the data support my first correlation—that presence of civic education within
the school curriculum leads to an increase in voter participation—I use statistics from the voter
turnout database from IDEA to construct a chart using the statistics important to this thesis (see
Table 1). Having established that after 2000, civic education, and thus civic nationalism, was
prominent in the school curricula, I make further observations regarding the first part of my
hypothesis with data from elections after 2000. However, I feel it is best to go through all the
data presented to first identify any trends in voter participation
Table 1. Voter Participation by Election Year

Country

Election type

Parliamentary
Bosnia and Herzegovina
Presidential

Parliamentary
Croatia
Presidential

Slovenia

Parliamentary

Year
2006
2002
2000
1998
2006
2002
1998
2007
2003
2000
2005
2000
2008
2004
2000
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Voter
Turnout
(%)*
36.75
55.45
63.7
70.74
55.45
70.74
59.58
61.65
76.55
51.04
60.88
63.1
60.64
70.36

Registration*

Voting age
population

2,736,886
2,342,141
2,508,349
2,656,758
2,736,886
2,342,141
2,656,758
4,229,681
4,087,553
3,685,378
4,392,220
4,252,921
1,696,437
1,634,402
1,586,695

3,539,921
3,178,427
3,053,221
3,256,197
3,539,921
3,178,427
3,256,197
3,557,272
3,501,832
3,484,951
3,533,725
3,484,951
1,645,967
1,622,422
1,543,425

Presidential

2007
2002

58.43
65.24

1,720,481
1,610,234

1,641,161
1,604,505

Source: Voter Turnout Database from IDEA.
* Including registered voters of Slovenia and Croatia living abroad.

The first evident trend is that the number of registered voters is consistently rising in both
Croatia and Slovenia. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, however, one can see that from 1998 to 2002,
the number of registered voters decreased, but then began to rise by the 2006 presidential
election. For the same country, the consistent decrease in voter participation is noticeably
apparent in both presidential and parliamentary elections. Thus, there is an obvious disconnect
by 2006, in which voter registration is at a relatively high level not seen since 1998, but voter
participation is considerably lower. I turn to the data provided by Democracy Web to determine
why this is the case. Out of a few possible explanations, continued existence of ethnic divisions
within the government and in the education system throughout the time period might be a
primary cause for voter dissatisfaction. Another possible explanation is that Democracy Web
shows that political rights within the country fluctuated, from a high rank of five in 2002 to four
in 2003, and further dropping to three in 2005 before rising again to four by the next year.
Upon looking at the other two states, Croatia and Slovenia, I find a generally higher voter
participation in parliamentary elections than in presidential elections. A slightly similar
disconnect is noted between registered voters and participation, with the former increasing but
the latter initially decreasing. Although statistics for participation are not available for the 1997
Slovenian presidential election, they were available for the 1997 Croatian presidential election,
and those numbers showed that 54.62 percent of registered voters turned out. As discussed in the
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historical and political background section, the political system of this country was set up to
favor the ruling political party of Croatia, HDZ, including the policy of allowing the Croatian
Diaspora to vote in such elections. This is also a reason why the number of voters registered is
higher than the voting age population within Croatia. For example, according to the National
Endowment for Democracy, there were 360,000 voters from abroad who cast their ballots in the
2000 parliament election. While in the 2003 election for parliament, the number of voters from
abroad was at 396,617. These voters from abroad are noted as being strong supports of the
nationalist HDZ, however as also noted previously, there is no system in place to prevent voters
from Bosnia and Herzegovina from going to vote within an electoral district in Croatia. In
regards to Slovenia, its electoral law also allows Slovenes abroad to cast their ballots in these
elections. The rather large turnout for the 2000 election could be viewed as a turning point for
independent Croatia following the death of Franjo Tudjman, which appears to have led to an
increase in participation. Information from Democracy Web further supports this conclusion,
stating that by 2002, greater political freedom was noted in national elections. The fact that in
2000 Croatia switched to a parliamentary system from a semi-presidential system might also
explain why more registered voters cast their ballots in elections for parliament than they did for
those for president. To summarize, for most of the time series, voter participation has actually
been decreasing until the 2007 election for Croatia and the 2008 election for Slovenia. I believe
this can be explained by the fact that the first generation that went through both primary and
secondary school in independent Slovenia and Croatia began to come of voting age around 2005.
These students, especially the Croatians, would have gone through both ethnic and later civic
nationalist curricula, and this could be why voter participation has begun to increase. Students
who would have gone through both primary and secondary education that included a civic
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education curriculum will begin to come of voting age in 2012. According to my hypothesis, I
propose that this trend of increased voter registration and participation will continue to increase.
I now move to see if the data support the second correlation in my hypothesis, in which
increased voter participation leads to a more democratic state. I first use the data provided by the
Polity IV dataset to look at the degree of democracy and the factors that cause the relative
strength or weakness of the level of democracy in each state. The Polity IV dataset measures
democracy in two ways. The first is through a polity variable, which takes into account autocracy
and democracy and scores those levels from negative ten to positive ten. Second is the
democracy variable, an eleven-point scale from zero to ten. I also include the autocracy variable,
as the polity score is made up of combining both the democracy and autocracy scores. In Table
2, the democracy and autocracy scores for each election of year of all three countries are shown.
After making a correlation table, I find that data for Bosnia are not available for most variables,
as it is considered by Polity IV a state in transition. To explain what each score signifies, for the
democracy variable, its score is dependent on the indicators for democracy which track
competitiveness of the system and composition of political participation, whose own variables go
from one to five, therefore a democracy score of ten means both indicator variables are those
which were coded as five. The autocracy score is based on factors such as fragmentation of a
system, coded from zero to three ranging on percentage of state fragmentation, and regulation of
participation. Therefore, an autocracy score of ten would mean that the indicator variables
determining the autocracy score are at their highest levels, an example being serious
fragmentation. As Bosnia and Herzegovina was a regime in transition for the entire period under
review, a score of negative sixty six appears which signifies that the regime is in transition. For
Slovenia, the polity score remained a consistent ten from 1998 to 2008, showing a robust
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democracy. The variable that looks at democracy supports the polity score, although it starts at
an eight for most of the period in review, and then rises to a score of nine from 2005 to 2008. At
this point, I want to examine some of the underlying factors that contribute to such a rating. The
two variables I look at are regulation of participation and competitiveness of participation. For
both variables, Slovenia scores a consistent five from 1998 to 2008. This means that different
political groups regularly compete for political influence and positions, and that the political
system is competitive. For Croatia, the polity score fluctuates greatly, moving from a negative
five in 1998 to an eight in 2000. No score was recorded for 1999 because it was considered a
year of transition. Since its democracy score was zero, but its autocracy score was a negative
five, I look to other variables that might explain why this is so. Croatia's regulation of
participation score for that year is three, which means it is labeled as sectarian. According to
Polity, this means is that multiple identity groups move between intense factionalism and
government favoritism. Also included under this label is that significant portions of the
population have historically been excluded from positions of power. By 2000, it is obvious that
regime transition had occurred. No scores were reported for the variable representing
competitiveness of participation in Croatia for the years 1998 and 1999. From 2000 onward,
Croatia's democracy score is consistent with that of Slovenia's. The difference is that its
regulation score stays at two, which is coded as a multiple identity system. Its competitiveness
score is a consistent four, which means it is a system in transition, usually toward a fully
regulated system, as is the case in Croatia. Based on these observations from the Polity data, I
can establish that Slovenia is a strong democracy throughout the time period in review, Croatia is
a regime in transition toward a more robust democracy, but insufficient data on Bosnia and
Herzegovina make it difficult to fully test my hypothesis.
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To elaborate on these findings from Polity IV, I turn to the database from IDEA and to
Democracy Web. I again use the voter turnout database from IDEA, this time to show the
political rights and civil liberties scores for each election year in each of the countries. This data
can be seen in Table 2. To mention, the political rights and civil liberties scores are based on a
seven point scale. For political rights, a rating of one means a wide range of political rights,
including free and fair elections; a rating of two means there exists political corruption, and
foreign or military influence; a rating of three, four or five denotes that a government moderately
protects almost all political rights. Six and seven are not present in the table, but these would
denote a heavy restriction, or lack of political rights. For civil liberties, a score of one signifies a
country has a wide range of civil liberties; a score of two means there are limits on media
independence, and discrimination is present; a score of three, four, or five signifies that the
government moderately protects almost all civil liberties. A score of six or seven is not present in
the table below, but those signify limits on rights of expression and association; and there being
present few or no civil liberties, respectively.
Table 2. Political Rights and Civil Liberties Scores
Country

Election Type

Parliamentary
Bosnia and
Herzegovina
Presidential

Parliamentary
Croatia
Presidential
Slovenia

Parliamentary

Year

Freedom house Political Rights

Freedom house Civil Liberties

Polity IV

2006
2002
2000
1998
2006
2002
1998
2007
2003
2000
2005
2000
2008

4
4
5
5
4
4
5
2
2
2
2
2
1

3
4
4
5
3
4
5
2
2
3
2
3
1

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
9
8
8
9
8
10
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Presidential

2004
2000
2007
2002

1
1
1
1

1
2
1
1

10
10
10
10

Source: Voter Turnout Database from Idea and Polity IV Dataset

By viewing the table, we can formulate general ideas and draw conclusions by combining
data from both datasets. Slovenia is mostly consistent in having the best scores for political rights
and civil liberties, aside from 2000, in which a score of two in civil liberties means that there
were limits on media independence, and some discrimination was present. Further information
provided by Democracy Web states that Slovenia's civil liberties score changed in 2003,
although no elaboration is provided about why that occurred, and I could not independently find
any further data to provide insight about that change. Interestingly, Slovenian law provides the
Hungarian and Italian minorities one seat each in the lower house of the national assembly, while
the Roma ethnic minority is given seats in twenty municipal councils. Croatia’s political rights
score of two is, according to Democracy Web, a result of political corruption and military
influence in government affairs. The improvement of civil liberties from 2000 onward can be
attributed to the transition from complete government control by the Croatian Democratic Union
to freer elections that led to other parties gaining power. It is also notable that Croatia reserves
eight seats in its national legislature for ethnic minorities. We can see that the increase in level of
democracy with regards to the polity scores is mirrored in the political rights and civil liberties
scores.
The data for Bosnia and Herzegovina, seen in Table 2, can be best described as
elucidating a regime transitioning steadily toward democracy. From the start of the time period
to 2002, the country’s political rights score was five because it remained divided along ethnic
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lines, along with the fact that ethnic Croats were left out of the government from 2001 onward.
Throughout the considered time period, Bosnia and Herzegovina remained ethnically divided,
with those divisions being institutionalized. As mentioned previously, students in Herzegovina
are segregated by ethnicity, and furthermore, educational appointments are highly politicized and
subject to ethnic favoritism. However, with improving conditions in Bosnia and Herzegovina,
including the attempt to reform and standardize different subjects of the primary and secondary
curriculum, it does appear that the country is moving steadily toward a more democratic system.
Therefore, this leaves the question of whether civic education increases participation
which in turn increases democracy within a state. Based on the analysis of the data available,
Croatia best supports this hypothesis because its voter registration not only continues to climb,
but its recent elections also have begun to see an increase in voter participation. This correlates
well with an increase in democracy on all variables included in it. The case of Slovenia also
supports my hypothesis, as it has consistently been a strong democracy throughout the years
included in the study. The fact, however, that it started out with high levels of voter participation
that gradually decreased over time, but then began to rise again by 2008, is something that
cannot be explained by the available data. I can at best conclude that it has to do with
generational differences. Further research must be conducted to determine whether this is indeed
the explanation. Bosnia and Herzegovina, as the research shows, is the most ethnically diverse
country, but also is the country that has invested the most effort in educating its youth for
democracy with a variety of civic education subjects. Despite low ratings in terms of how
democratic the state was in 1998, it has gradually moved to being more democratic throughout
the time period. What excludes it from fully supporting my hypothesis is that voter participation
was consistently decreasing by large percentages.
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I now turn to my second hypothesis—that the presence of ethnic nationalism, while not
taking into account participation, may contribute to a state regime being less democratic. In
Slovenia, which has the most ethnic homogeneity with more than 90 percent of its population
being ethnic Slovene, I could not find any strong support to show that there was any sizable
ethnic nationalism influencing the educational system. Even on a national scale, political parties
that support such rhetoric are considered fringe parties with little influence on government
policy. Therefore, since it does lack this variable, the Slovenia case cannot prove or disprove this
hypothesis. In the case of Croatia, which has an ethnic makeup of about a quarter Croat and
about 10 percent Serb, strong ethnic nationalism was evident throughout the first decade of its
independence. As described previously, nationalist leader Franjo Tudjman made sure that an
especially Croatian nationalistic point of view was present in the social studies curriculum, and
civic education courses that emphasized democracy did not come about until after the HDZ lost
power in 2000. As late as 2003, discrimination against minorities was still present, but indeed, as
shown by the civil liberties score, restrictions on such liberties were being lifted from 2000 on.
Since the sample from IDEA includes only two election years in which ethnic nationalism was
still dominant in national rhetoric and school institutions, I can only say that my findings are
inconclusive. There certainly appears to be some correlation, since a decrease in ethnic
nationalist rhetoric and presence in the school system began to immediately show in terms of
relative democracy in Croatia. Bosnia and Herzegovina, which is the most heterogeneous in
terms of ethnic and cultural diversity, provides partial support for this hypothesis. I say ―partial‖
because officially, the national government is made up of a coalition of the three main ethnic
groups in a power-sharing agreement. The government also has officially promoted democracy,
tolerance of ethnic diversity, and other civic values being taught in primary and secondary
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schools. What slows this progress is regional dominance by the different ethnic groups, which
allows them to teach the subjects within social studies their own way, despite the inclusion of
civics courses. Aside from segregated schools in Herzegovina, each ethnic group is taught
subjects such as history and literature in a separate way that includes using different textbooks.
Also, corruption within the higher echelons of the education system further bogs down progress.
Such issues might help explain the country’s rankings of five and four in political rights and civil
liberties throughout the time period. In summary, with a lack of data and mixed findings from
Bosnia and Herzegovina, I cannot disprove this hypothesis, but I cannot fully say there is enough
to support what it proposes.
Having observed the data relating to both hypotheses, I go on to observe the additional
factors to see if my findings can be explained by any other factors. I first see if GDP per capita,
as some scholars have proposed, has any effect on the growth and development of a democratic
regime. It is clear from looking at the figures that Slovenia has led the other two states in relative
wealth since the start of the time series, followed by Croatia, and then by Bosnia and
Herzegovina. Judging by this, one can propose a correlation between national wealth and
democracy. However, such inference, I believe, would be spurious, since relative national wealth
cannot alone explain why participation levels fluctuate as they did. Consequently, I now turn to
the data of how fragmented each state is, since that had been one of the bases of selection for the
three cases. Upon going through a year-by-year listing for state fragmentation in the Polity IV
dataset, I find no fragmentation within either Slovenia or Croatia. I do find serious
fragmentation, coded with a number three, for each year under study in Bosnia and Herzegovina,
which means that over 25 percent of its territory is separated from central authority. This might
explain why both levels of registration and voting have gone down, but it does not explain why
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Bosnia's voting participation rate was as high as Slovenia's and Croatia's at the beginning of the
time series. This might also explain why Bosnia's numerous civic education programs are slowly
starting to show some results as the younger generation comes of age and makes its presence felt
in both voter registration and participation.

Table 3. Education Statistics

Country

Adult
Literacy
Rate

Youth
Literacy
Rate

Compulsory
Education
Age Range

Expenditure
on Education
as % of GDP

Expenditure on
Education as %
of total
Government
Expenditure

Average
Years of
Schooling
For Adults
Over 25

Bosnia and
Herzegovina

96.7

99.8

6-15*

N/A

N/A

8.7

Croatia

98.1

99.6

7-14

4.0

10.0

8.8

Slovenia

99.7

99.8

6-14

5.8

12.6

8.9

Source: UNESCO Institute for Statistics and UNDP Human Development Report

*For Bosnia and Herzegovina, the ending age for compulsory education changed to 14 in 2008.
The last factor which I observe is central one of the oldest propositions made by scholars,
including Lipset: that education in general increases the relative strength of democracy within a
country. Table 3 shows the factors involving education which I include in my observations
relating to education in general. Slovenia had a 99 percent literacy rate for adults and youth for
the entire period. Croatia had a 98 percent literacy rate for adults and a 99 percent literacy rates
for youth through the period. Bosnia and Herzegovina's literacy rate for adults went from 96 to
97 percent during the time period, while its youth literacy rate was maintained at 99 percent. The
starting and ending ages of compulsory education are similar enough to allow me to conclude
that this particular factor has little explaining affect over levels of participation and of
democracy. I would have liked to have included further educational measures to fully observe
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any correlations between general education levels and democracy, but lack of data for Bosnia
and Herzegovina meant that I cannot. Going on literacy rates alone, one can see that they mirror
the relative strength of democracy in each state, but to add further depth I also look at the
average years of schooling for adults, the data for which was collected from the UNDP Human
Development Report. These numbers again appear rather ordinal in regards to their slight
differences from the respective countries. Therefore, upon considering these two education
measures, I cannot fully conclude that the relationship between general education and level of
democracy is a spurious one. I also wanted to observe in depth expenditure on education as
percentage of GDP, but data was insufficient for each country, specifically there was no data
reported by UNESCO for Bosnia and Herzegovina, as seen on Table 3. Consequently, without
additional data, these additional factors mentioned do not seem to provide any alternative
explanation for the results I have observed for both of my hypotheses.
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Conclusion
This thesis investigated the determinants that make a state more or less democratic
through the political socialization strategies that such a state employs with its education policies.
Specifically, I aimed to explore whether any empirical support exists for the link between the
civic education process and political participation as the result of such process, as well as
whether civic versus ethnic nationalist ideals imposed on the youth through the education system
affect the democratization efforts in a newly created state. I began with a review of the relevant
literature. I examined the literature that is important to the field of political socialization, going
through the different stages to which it has historically been applied. I then included works on
the impact of political socialization specifically in Yugoslavia, which provides background for
study into its successor states of Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina. I then moved to
more recent studies into the field of civic education, as well as their implications into modern
studies of how societies educate toward democracy. I then reviewed prior research that applied
civic education to the countries considered in this thesis. I explored whether empirical support
exists for the link between the civic education process and political participation as the output of
such process, as well as whether civic versus ethnic nationalist ideals imposed on youth through
the education system affect democratization efforts in a newly created state. I found that most
research applying political socialization to specific case studies is out of date and does not
consider the condition of civic education. Furthermore, I found a lack of comparative studies
utilizing the civic education theory outside of the United States, where the theory appears most
popular among researchers.
Theoretically, my research adds to prior studies on political socialization by examining
how education affects increased political participation by youth and, in turn, democratization in
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newly created countries. Given my focus on Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia Herzegovina, this
thesis also adds to the research on state-building and political socialization within Eastern and
Central Europe. Methodologically, the major contribution of my study is the use of a qualitative
approach, as well as a descriptive analysis of quantitative data. More specifically, as opposed to
using either a single case study or quantitative analysis, I employ a comparative case study
design. As such, I attain a more refined theoretical framework by including a wide range of data.
I make observations of data relating to my main hypothesis and find that in all three states, civic
nationalism exists, with the strongest civic education programs in the ethnically diverse countries
of Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. I find that participation is actually decreasing despite the
presence of civic education programs, and has only begun to rise by the last data point in the
series. My explanation is that the younger generation that had experienced most of these civic
education programs would have just started to come of voting age around 2005, and therefore
their real impact on elections would then start to be evident. I also find that Bosnia and
Herzegovina does not fully support my hypothesis, since despite having the most civic education
programs, its democracy score and supporting variables that denote levels of democracy are the
lowest among all three cases. Slovenia and Croatia, however, do support my hypothesis in which
steady levels of democracy are noted. I believe that further research must be continued on this
subject to gain further data, especially as the first generation to go entirely through civic
education in all countries examined will come of voting age in 2012. Therefore, it would be
important to note how these new voters will impact levels of participation, which I believe will
be in a positive manner, which should then impact relative levels of democracy.
As to the hypothesis that posits that the presence of ethnic nationalism within the system
of education will have a negative effect on the level of democracy, I find my results inconclusive
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because of lack of data. Croatia comes closest to supporting this thesis, but with insufficient data,
and with Bosnia and Herzegovina providing mixed results, I can neither completely confirm nor
reject this hypothesis. Further research must be done, especially throughout the first decade of
independence of each state, in which a strong ethnic nationalism was noted in all three countries
that would, according to my thesis, affect the growth and level of democracy. In my observations
of the additional factors included in my study, I find no major correlation that could explain their
connection to both participation and level of democracy. I do feel that further data must be
collected about money invested in the education system to further test any possible link with
levels of democracy.
I would like to address the limitations of my study. Although political participation can
be broadly defined, I limited political participation in my study to voter registration and voter
participation because of the limit of available data relating to other activities of political
participation in each respective country. Specifically, I believe adding numbers and participation
in each of the political parties of each country would have made my findings more robust in my
proposed correlation between civic education and participation. The other limitation of
importance in my study is the lack of in-depth data relating to the type of curriculum being
taught in each specific region of Bosnia and Herzegovina. As noted, each region is in charge of
implementing its own curriculum, and significant differences are apparent from region to region.
Furthermore, it would have been useful to have had access to what exactly is being taught in
these civic education courses in each country, since many times the names of these civic
education courses may not exactly mirror what is being taught in individual classrooms. Taking
these two features into full effect, I believe my findings could have been more robust in the
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testing the correlation between civic education, conditioned by civic nationalism, leading to an
increase in democracy.

47

References
Almond, Gabriel A., and Sidney Verba. 1989. The civic culture: Political attitudes and
democracy in five nations. Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications, Inc.
Bass, Warren. 1998. The triage of Dayton. Foreign Affairs 77 (5): 95–108.
Belloni, Roberto. 2007. State building and international intervention in Bosnia. New York, NY:
Routledge.
Bertsch, Gary K., and Thomas W. Ganschow. 1976. Comparative communism: The Soviet,
Chinese, and Yugoslav models. San Francisco, CA: W.H. Freeman and Company.
Burg, Steven L., and Paul S. Shoup. 2000. The war in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Ethnic conflict and
international intervention. Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpo.
Burglund, Sten, Joakim Ekman, and Frank H. Aarebrot. 2004. The handbook of political change
in Eastern Europe. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing.
Chenoweth, Eric and James P. Young. 2003. Democracy Web: Comparative Studies in Freedom.
Albert Shanker Institute.
Civic Education Study. International Association for the Evaluation of Educational
Achievement. www.iea.nl/cived.html
Coppieters, Bruno, N. Fotion, and Nick Fotion. 2008. Moral constraints on war: Principles and
cases. Plymouth, UK: Lexington Books.
Cousins, Elizabeth M., and Charles K. Cater. 2001. Toward peace in Bosnia: Implementing the
Dayton Accords. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc.
Danoff, Brian. 2010. Education democracy: Alex de Tocqueville and leadership in America.
Albany, NY: SUNY Press
Dennis, Jack. 1968. Major problems in political socialization research. Midwest Journal of
Political Science 12 (1): 85–114.
48

European Election Database. www.nsd.uib.no/european_election_database/about.
Fischer, Martina. 2005. Peacebuilding and civil society in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Ten years after
Dayton. Munster, Germany: LIT Verlag.
Goodlad, John L., Corinne Mantle-Bromley, and Stephen John Goodlad. 2004. Education for
everyone: Agenda for education in a democracy. San Francisco, CA: Jassey-Bass.
Hollygus, D. Sunshine. 2005. The missing link: Exploring the relationship between higher
education and political engagement. Political Behavior 27 (1): 25–47.
International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance. www.idea.int
Kenworthy, Lane, and Melissa Malami. 1999. Gender inequality in political representation: A
worldwide comparative analysis. Social Forces 78 (1): 235–268.
Kunovich, Robert M., and Randy Hodson. 2002. Ethnic diversity, segregation, and inequality:
A structural model of ethnic prejudice in Bosnia and Croatia. The Sociological
Quarterly 43 (2): 185–212.
Kunovich, Robert M., and Catherine Deitelbaum. 2004. Ethnic conflict, group polarization, and
gender attitudes in Croatia. Journal of Marriage and Family 66 (5): 1089–1107.
Levinson, Bradley A., and Doyle Stevik. 2007. Reimagining civic education: How diverse
societies form democratic citizens. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
Levstik, Linda S., and Cynthia A. Tyson. 2008. Handbook of research in social studies
education. New York, NY: Taylor & Francis.
Lipset, Seymour Martin. 1959. Some social requisites of democracy: Economic development
and political legitimacy. The American Political Science Review 53 (1): 69–105.

49

Macedo, Stephen. 2005. Democracy at risk: How political choices undermine citizen
participation, and what we can do about it. Harrisbourg, VA: Brookings Institution
Press.
Miller, Henry. 2002. Civic literacy: How informed citizens make democracy work. Hanover, NH:
UPNE.
Marshall, Monty G., and Keith Jaggers. 2004. Polity IV Project. Center for Global Policy,
George Mason University.
National Endowment for Democracy. www.ned.org.
Nikolayenko, Olena. 2007. Political Support among adolescents in post-communist hybrid
regimes. PhD diss., University of Toronto.
Paczulla, Jutta. 2004. The Long, Difficult Road to Dayton. International Journal 60 (1): 255–
272.
Peefley, Mark and Robert Rohrschneider. 2003. Democratization and political tolerance in
seventeen countries: A multi-level model of democratic learning. Political Research
Quarterly 56 (3): 243–257.
Prewitt, Kenneth, and Joseph Okello-Oculi. 1970. Political socialization and political education
in the new nations. In Learning about politics: A reader in political science, edited by
Roberta S. Sigel, 607–621. New York, NY: Random House Inc.
Putnam, Robert. 2001. Bowling Alone: The collapse and revival of American community. New
York, NY: Simon and Shuster.
Ramet, Sabrina P., and Davorka Matic. 2007. Democratic transition in Croatia: Value
transformation, education and media. College Station, TX: Texas A&M University
Press.

50

Sears, David O. 1975. Political socialization. In Handbook of political science, vol. 2, edited by
F. I. Greenstein and N. W. Polsby. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.
Shani, Danielle. 2009. On the origins of political interest. PhD diss., Princeton University.
Shrader, Charles R. 2003. The Muslim-Croat civil war in Central Bosnia: A military
history, 1992–1994. College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press.
Siaroff, Alan. 2000. Comparative European party systems: An analysis of parliamentary
elections since 1945. New York, NY: Garland Publishing.
Sigel, Roberta S. 1970. Learning about politics: A reader in political science. New York, NY:
Random House Inc.
Slomczynski, Kazimierz, and Goldi Shabad. 1998. Can support for democracy and the market
be learned in school? A national experiment in post-communist Poland. Political
Psychology 19 (4): 749–779.
Taras, Raymond C., and Rajat Ganguly. 2008. Understanding ethnic conflict: The international
dimension. Upper Saddler River, NJ: Pearson Education Inc.
Torney-Purta, Judith, John Schwille, and Jo-Ann Amadeo. 1999. Civic education across
countries: Twenty-four national case studies from the IEA Civic Education Project.
The Netherlands: Eburon Publishers.
UNESCO Institute for Statistics. www.uis.unesco.org
United Nations Development Program. www.undp.org
Volgyes, Ivan. 1975. Political socialization in Eastern Europe: A comparative framework.
Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger Publishers.
Westheimer, Joel and Joseph Kahne. 2004. What kind of citizen? The politics of educating
for democracy. American Educational Research Journal 41 (2): 237–269.

51

Zajda, Joseph, Holger Daun, and Lawrence J. Saha. 2008. Nation-building, identity and
citizenship education: Cross-cultural perspectives. New York, NY: Springer.

52

Vita
Aldo Lopez is a native of El Paso, Texas. He graduated from Montwood High School in
2005. He attended the University of Texas at El Paso, where he received his Bachelors of Arts
degree in social studies with a minor in secondary education in the spring of 2009. He was
accepted into the political science graduate program in the fall of 2009. He was also employed as
a graduate assistant in the same department from the fall of 2009 to the spring of 2011.

Permanent Address: 11736 Francis Scobee
El Paso, Texas 79936

This thesis/dissertation was typed by Aldo Lopez.

53

